INTRODUCTION
Defense and the environment is not an either-or proposition. To choose between them is impossible in this real world of serious defense threats and genuine environmental concerns. The real choice is whether we are going to build a new environmental ethic into the daily business of defense.
-Dick Cheney, Former Vice President and then-Secretary of Defense 2 For several decades, and in a variety of contexts, national security and environmental protection interests have clashed.
3 Balancing these competing concerns is a challenging task. 4 However, in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government "drastically changed its approach to how it handled important environmental concerns in relation to national defense issues." NEPA, NATIONAL SECURITY, OCEAN NOISE
327
The most common manifestation of the tensions between national security and environmental protection objectives is the Navy's use of sonar in U.S. waters. The oceans that surround the United States on both coasts provide the U.S. Navy with an indispensable buffer zone in which to test and implement national security objectives. Advancing these important objectives for the safety and welfare of the nation's citizens must, however, be tempered by the equally compelling need for vigilant stewardship of marine living resources.
Marine mammals are particularly vulnerable to underwater noise intrusion associated with the Navy's national security operations.
6 Already imperiled by a variety of other anthropogenic influences, the safety and sustainability of marine mammals hangs precariously in the balance if national security objectives are advanced without due regard for the viability of these species. The integration of the new environmental ethic into the daily business of defense to which then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney alluded remains a largely unfulfilled promise with regard to the Navy's use of sonar.
The Navy's enhanced use of sonar is part of a larger trend of increasingly aggressive use of national security measures in the post-9/11 world. 7 This state of heightened vigilance has taken its toll on marine mammals. The Navy's use of low frequency active sonar generates "one of the loudest sounds that human beings can make in the water." 8 To make matters worse, these low frequency sounds can travel for hundreds of miles. 9 Although mass strandings of whales have been linked to the Navy's use of mid-frequency active sonar, 10 the Navy contends that its use of widely deployed low-frequency active sonar does not pose such a risk. 11 Environmental groups strongly contest this assertion and have challenged the Navy's use of low frequency sonar in a series of cases in the past decade, culminating in the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Winter v. NRDC.
12
Part 1 of this article considers the importance of the Navy's use of sonar to promote national security objectives and reviews the impacts that this practice has on marine mammals. Part 2 provides a brief history of 328 ABATE cases under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 13 challenging the Navy's use of sonar and its impacts on marine mammals. It also addresses the emergency exception under NEPA and how the Navy's assertion of this exception set the stage for the conflict in Winter v. NRDC. Part 3 addresses the U.S. Supreme Court's controversial decision in Winter and considers the unanswered questions that remain in its wake. Part 4 proposes possible future directions for regulating Navy sonar in the wake of Bush era national security policies. It concludes that the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) should be amended to include a citizen suit provision to enhance protection of marine mammals from the effects of ocean noise in a manner that does not undermine national security objectives. It also endorses the need for additional substantive safeguards such as regional cooperation and safe havens for marine mammals in new legislation and regulations that go beyond the piecemeal "temporary fix" of protection for marine mammals that can be secured in a successful NEPA challenge.
NAVY SONAR AND MARINE MAMMALS
Navy sonar is an important tool to promote national security, especially in the post-9/11 world; however, sonar has devastating impacts on marine mammals. This part of the article explores the role that sonar plays in promoting national security and considers the types and extent of impacts that this practice has on marine mammals.
Navy Sonar as a Tool to Promote National Security
Sound is a vital means through which safety in the marine environment is promoted. This principle holds true not only for the oceans' inhabitants but also for promoting the Navy's national security objectives.
14 "The Navy is charged with maintaining, training, and equipping combat-ready naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression, and ensuring freedom of the seas." 15 An essential component of the Navy's responsibility is anti-submarine warfare. 16 The navies of potential adversary nations already possess 13 See 42 U.S.C. § § 4321-4370f (2006 17 These submarines "possess tactical characteristics that are extremely difficult to counter-stealth and lethality."
18 If able to penetrate U.S. or multinational task force defenses, these submarines "could undermine military efforts to thwart hostile enemy forces, and could change the balance of political support for U.S. involvement in an armed conflict." 19 To respond to these threats, the Navy has used sound navigation and ranging ("sonar") to track submarines. 20 For the Navy to effectively engage in combat at sea, sonar is necessary for both offensive and defensive tactics. 21 Sonar employs sound to "help ships and submarines navigate and communicate" 22 and "determine water depths, presence of vessels, and the location of mines." 23 Sonar is used in three contexts. The first and most important use of sonar occurs in military engagement. The Navy also uses sonar to ensure national security objectives. Third, and most controversially, the Navy conducts regular and rigorous testing of sonar systems to ensure readiness for military engagement and national security objectives. It is the "testing to ensure readiness" aspect of the Navy's sonar use that has generated the most controversy regarding the impacts on marine mammals. Few would question that military engagement must take priority over threats to marine mammals; however, the preparation for those military engagement scenarios can and should be conducted in a manner that is more sensitive and responsive to the needs of marine mammals.
There are two basic types of sonar: passive and active. 24 Passive sonar "receives transmissions of sound and is primarily used to detect the presence of submarines and other objects," 25 whereas active sonar "both receives and 330 ABATE transmits sound." 26 Active sonar transmits "pings" of sound. 27 A sonar operator then listens for the echo of the sound, which allows the operator to measure the size of the object from which the sound bounced and to measure the distance between the operator and the object."
28
The Navy has three types of active sonar systems. 29 First, Mid-Frequency Active Sonar (MFAS), which the Navy has been using since World War II, employs frequencies of one to ten kilohertz (kHz) and typically can detect objects one to ten nautical miles away."
30 "Second, Low-Frequency Active Sonar (LFAS) uses sound frequencies of less than 1 kHz, which suffer less attenuation in seawater and hence allow the Navy to detect objects up to 100 nautical miles away."
31 "Third, the Navy uses its Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) LFAS system for long-range search and surveillance of submarines, 32 and it would like to employ that system in at least 75% of the world's oceans."
"At the source, low-frequency active sonar projects at an approximate level of 215 dB, although it is contended that at the convergence zones where the signals begin to combine, the acoustic level can reach 240 dB."
33 These levels far exceed the sound emitted by a Concorde jet at takeoff. 
Harmful Effects of Sonar on Marine Mammals
Marine mammals depend on sound much like humans depend on sight. 35 NEPA, NATIONAL SECURITY, OCEAN NOISE 331 mother-offspring bonding. 36 Sound is how marine mammals find their way through the world every day.
37
Marine mammals' reliance on sound for survival has made these species vulnerable to the Navy's use of sonar. Human-generated sound was not known as a potential threat to marine mammals until the 1970s. 38 In recent years, the harmful effects of human-generated sound on marine life have become a subject of great concern in matters concerning national defense.
39
Widely used by the Navy for decades and currently on over 50 percent of its vessels, mid-frequency active sonar has been linked to numerous whale strandings throughout the world. 40 The link between the Navy's use of mid-frequency sonar and marine mammal mortality has been conclusively established. 41 In fact, the Navy's own consultants concluded that "the evidence of sonar causation is, in our opinion, completely convincing and that therefore there is a serious issue of how best to avoid/minimize future beaching events."
42
Strandings have occurred throughout the world, "with stranded animals found with bleeding around the brain, emboli in the lungs, and lesions in the liver and kidneys, symptoms resembling a severe case of decompression sickness, or "the bends." 43 Worse still, strandings of whales may represent "only the tip of the iceberg," 44 because these injuries occur at sea and substantially larger numbers may be dying offshore. In addition to strandings and non-auditory injuries, the harmful effects of mid-frequency sonar may include temporary or permanent loss of hearing, which impairs an animal's ability to communicate, avoid predators, and detect and capture prey; avoidance behavior, which can lead to abandonment of habitat or migratory pathways, and disruption of important behaviors such as mating, feeding, nursing, or migration; aggressive (or agonistic) behavior, which can result in injury; masking of biologically meaningful sounds, such as the call of predators or potential mates; and declines in the availability and viability of prey species, such as fish and shrimp. Id. 45 Id.
ABATE
The most notorious example of these impacts involved the mass strandings of whales and other marine mammals linked to the Navy's use of midfrequency sonar.
46
[I]n March 2000, sixteen whales from at least three different species stranded over 150 miles of shoreline along the northern channels of the Bahamas. These beachings occurred within twenty-four hours of U.S. Navy ships using mid-frequency sonar in those same channels. Post-mortem examinations found, in every whale examined, hemorrhaging in and around the ears and other tissues related to sound conduction or production, such as the larynx and auditory fats, some of which was debilitative and potentially severe. It is now accepted that these mortalities were caused, through an unknown mechanism, by the Navy's use of mid-frequency sonar." 47 Although these strandings have mostly involved whales, other cetacean species have also stranded in connection with the Navy's use of sonar.
48 "Possible triggers for the strandings include a behavioral response that causes deep divers to alter their diving behavior, which then results in decompression sickness-like impacts." 49 Public awareness of the impacts of ocean noise grew stronger in 1995 when, after urging from NRDC, the Navy disclosed the development of SUR-TASS LFAS. After a five-year administrative review process, including a programmatic Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), a Navy-sponsored scientific research program using the LFA system at significantly reduced source levels, and tens of thousands of public comments opposed to the proposed deployment, NMFS issued a Final Rule. This rule granted a "small take" permit pursuant to the MMPA allowing the Navy to seek and obtain annual authorization to use LFA in 75 percent of the world's oceans. NRDC and others once again sued. 50 The war against the Navy's use of sonar was in full swing.
A flashpoint of controversy in the past decade, the Navy's use of SUR-TASS LFAS "can affect marine mammals across hundreds of miles because of the power and intensity of the sound waves." 51 This noise "can agitate nerve endings deep within the skin or cause gas bubbles to form in the gastrointestinal tract, even at long distances, around the Navy's LFA sonar system." 
NEPA CHALLENGES TO NAVY SONAR
This section addresses the evolution of NEPA litigation involving Navy sonar and the role of NEPA's emergency exception in this context. For a variety of reasons, NEPA has been the most widely used and most successful weapon for environmental groups' challenges to Navy sonar. As these cases illustrate, however, the Navy is well insulated procedurally and substantively from challenges to its use of sonar. In most instances, the Navy "wins the war" in these cases by being able to proceed with its plans to use sonar, even if it loses some of the legal skirmishes along the way.
Evolution of NEPA Sonar Cases
Prior to the long line of NEPA cases challenging Navy sonar from the late 1990s to the present, the first ocean noise pollution case was filed under NEPA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) in 1994. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Department of the Navy, NRDC and other environmental organizations sought to enjoin the implementation of a National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) regulation that authorized the taking of marine mammals over a five-year period pursuant to the Navy's weaponstesting program. 59 NRDC sought to enjoin the Navy from conducting a "shipshock" trial, a five-year underwater explosives program proposed for waters in and around the Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary off the Southern California coast. 60 The ship-shock program was proposed to occur in an area of recognized marine mammal aggregation and species diversity. 62 NMFS issued a Final Rule under the MMPA approving the fiveyear testing program and requiring the Navy, as a precondition to the testing, to obtain a Letter of Authorization for each test. 63 Based on another EA, the Navy then sought and received a Letter of Authorization for a ship-shock test.
64
The court granted the injunction and held that the plaintiffs demonstrated a near-certain likelihood of prevailing on the merits on their claims that the challenged regulation and the challenged letter of authorization each violated the MMPA and NEPA primarily because the NMFS and the Navy both failed to adequately consider possible alternative sites for the planned ship-shock trial. 65 In addition, the court concluded that it was sufficiently likely that further surveying and consideration would locate an alternate area that would result in the taking of fewer marine mammals and other animals. 66 As a result, the court determined that the failure to issue this injunction would result in irreparable harm. 67 The court noted that "[a]ny other interpretation of the MMPA would allow NMFS to authorize projects that would result in the taking of an unnecessarily high number of marine mammals."
68
This successful ocean noise suit under NEPA laid a foundation for a long line of subsequent NEPA-based challenges to the Navy's use of sonar and its impacts on marine mammals. NEPA challenges to the Navy's use of sonar began in the late-1990s and have continued to the present. Two of these cases involved unsuccessful challenges to Navy sonar in Hawaii. First, in Ocean Mammal Institute v. Cohen, the plaintiffs filed suit under NEPA and the MMPA to enjoin the Departments of the Navy, Commerce, and Defense's ongoing tests of low-frequency active sonar adjacent to the west coast of Hawaii. 69 The plaintiffs contended that the NMFS violated NEPA when it issued a permit for the testing. 70 The Court held that the NMFS did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner in issuing the permit for the research project, and that the Navy and the NMFS did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner in determining that the proposed research 62 Id. 63 would not have a significant impact on the environment. 71 The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs failed to show either a likelihood of success on the merits or that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in their favor and that they would suffer irreparable harm.
72
In another challenge to the Navy's use of sonar in waters off the coast of Hawaii, the plaintiffs in Hawaii County Green Party v. Clinton sought injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the Navy's use of low-frequency active sonar tests and research in that area. 73 Following the court's dismissal of this initial action, 74 the plaintiffs filed another action challenging the Navy's development and deployment of sonar defense systems under NEPA, the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the MMPA. 75 The plaintiffs sought to reopen the first case, and the Navy moved to dismiss the current case. 76 The court held that the claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and NEPA were not ripe for review because they challenged an ongoing environmental impact statement process concerning the deployment of sonar testing. The claim under the MMPA was ripe, but plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claim because they had not alleged an injury in fact from the alleged procedural violations.
77 Therefore, the motion to reopen the case was denied and the motion to dismiss was granted.
78
In Cetacean Community v. Bush, a suit was filed in the name of the cetacean community of whales, dolphins, and porpoises. 79 The suit alleged that the Navy's proposed deployment of low frequency active sonar during a time of heightened threat violated various environmental statutes. 80 In granting the government's motion to dismiss, the court held that: (1) animals lacked standing to sue under the ESA, the MMPA, and NEPA; (2) the claim that the special system of deployment (SURTASS LFAS) violated the statutes 71 Id. at * 6. These studies sought to measure the responses of humpback and sperm whales to bursts of low-frequency sonar. Id. at * 1. 72 Id. at * 3. 73 124 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Haw. 2000). 74 Id. at 1173. 75 Id. 76 Id. at 1191. 77 Id. at 1200. 78 Id. at 1194. 79 'in his capacity as a member of the National Command Authorities because the National Command Authorities will determine when a threat or warfare condition exists.' However, since the President is not an 'agency' within the meaning of APA, Plaintiff cannot obtain judicial review under APA of its claims that the President violated, or will violate, MMPA or NEPA." Id. at 1213-14. 80 Id. at 1207. Both the small take application and the Navy's Draft and Final EISs are specifically limited to use of SURTASS LFA sonar during training, testing, and routine military operations and will not cover use of the SURTASS LFA system in self-defense, in times of war, combat, or heightened threat conditions. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 46717.
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ABATE was unripe for adjudication; and (3) the President of United States was not amenable to suit.
81
The court held that the plaintiff's claims regarding SURTASS LFAS were unripe for three reasons. First, there has been no final agency action for the plaintiff to challenge since the defendants have not even proposed the use of SURTASS LFAS in threat and warfare situations. Second, the plaintiff suffered no hardship from an agency regulation, since no agency has promulgated regulations dealing with the defendants' use of SURTASS LFAS during threat and warfare conditions. Third, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that its case is ripe because the defendants will likely avoid "compliance with the three statutes until an emergency situation arises that precludes judicial review of the failure to comply" as pure speculation, especially in light of the defendants' declaration that they plan to use SURTASS LFAS in "armed conflict or direct combat support operations" or "during periods of heightened threat conditions, as determined by the National Command Authorities." 82 This initial line of cases represents the "first wave" of ocean noise challenges against the Navy. The "ship shock" case was a victory for the environmental groups because the NMFS failed to consider alternatives. By contrast, the next two cases failed because the issues were no longer ripe, because the tests already had been conducted, and for lack of standing since an animal could not sue. In the "second wave" of cases, suits challenged an NMFS Final Rule in 2000, which granted a "small take" permit under the MMPA "allowing the Navy to seek and obtain annual authorization to use LFA in 75% of the world's oceans." 83 In the first of this "second wave" of cases, NRDC v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, NRDC challenged the Navy's Littoral Warfare Advanced Development Program ("LWAD"), a series of tests for the development of a broad range of high-intensity active sonar devices. 84 The plaintiffs alleged that the Navy violated NEPA, the ESA, and the MMPA by treating each test as a separate, individual activity, rather than analyzing the environmental impact of the series as a programmatic whole. 85 The court held that programmatic review of the series of tests was not required because the tests were neither connected nor cumulative and the Navy's general planning of the program did not itself result in an environmental impact or irreversible commitment of resources. 86 The court concluded that the Navy had chosen to conduct separate environmental 81 Cetacean Cmty., 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1211-1214. 82 In NRDC v. Evans, the plaintiffs claimed that the NMFS improperly approved use of LFA in as much as 75 percent of the world's oceans in violation of the MMPA, ESA, and APA. 88 The plaintiffs also claimed that the Navy participated in the ESA violation and issued an inadequate EIS in violation of NEPA and the APA. 89 The court held that the plaintiffs demonstrated that the defendants should have considered training in areas that present a reduced risk of harm to marine life and the marine environment when practicable, and should have considered extending shutdown procedures beyond marine mammals and sea turtles to schools of fish. 90 The court held that the defendants' alternatives analysis was arbitrary and capricious. 91 The court granted the plaintiffs' request for an injunction, holding that the plaintiffs had established irreparable harm. 92 The injunction was "carefully tailored to reduce the risk to marine mammals and endangered species by restricting the sonar's use in areas that are particularly rich in marine life, while still allowing the Navy to use this technology for testing and training in a variety of oceanic conditions."
93 Furthermore, the injunction was only to be in place "until the defendants correct the violations identified in this opinion."
94 "After the injunction, the Navy entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs regarding low-frequency sonar, which restricted the Navy's use of sonar to a "defined and limited area of the western North Pacific Ocean." 95 In Ocean Mammal Institute v. Gates, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Navy's use of MFA sonar. 96 The plaintiffs claimed that the Navy violated NEPA by: (1) failing to provide the required public notice and opportunity to comment on the first EA; (2) preparing EAs that were substantively flawed and inadequate; (3) failing to prepare an EIS for its undersea warfare exercises (USWEXs). 99 On October 15, 2007, the Navy issued a new EA ("Revised EA") and FONSI ("Revised FONSI"). 100 The Revised EA clarified and revised the First EA's analysis of the CZMA and contained analysis of the potential environmental impacts of USWEX based on the public comments received on the First EA. 101 The Navy determined that none of the comments altered its January 2007 determination that its USWEXs would not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. 102 The Revised EA and FONSI concluded that there was no threat of significant harm to the environment and, thus, an EIS was not required. 103 The Navy subsequently completed its long-planned Hawaii Range Complex Final EIS/Overseas EIS, which covered all of the Navy's future training activities in the Hawaii Range Complex. 104 Following the completion of the EIS, the Navy moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim as moot. 105 The court dismissed the case as moot, holding that the Navy's preparation of the EIS superseded the challenged EA negative determinations.
106
In NRDC, Inc. v. Gutierrez, NRDC and other environmental organizations claimed that the defendants, the Navy and the Department of Commerce violated NEPA by: (1) failing to consider all reasonable alternatives to the proposed deployment of SURTASS LFA; (2) failing to address or inappropriately rejecting mitigation measures; and (3) failing to consider all reasonably foreseeable individual and cumulative impacts of LFA. 107 The plaintiffs challenged whether the failure to consider any form of a dual criteria 108 -in light of the importance of the location of the continental shelf to the environmental impact and the fact that the Navy has been operating under a dual criteria for five years-constituted a violation of NEPA's requirement to consider all 98 Id. at 965. 99 reasonable alternatives. 109 The court held that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of succeeding on the issue of the defendants' alleged failure to adequately examine designation of additional offshore biologically important areas and issued an injunction.
110
As the NEPA cases in this section reflect, environmental plaintiffs enjoyed some success with NEPA challenges to Navy sonar; however, procedural obstacles precluded the plaintiffs from securing greater relief. Moreover, NEPA is a procedural statute and litigation under it rarely results in enduring substantive protections for marine mammals.
NEPA's Emergency Exception
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 111 a case in which the Court rejected a NEPA challenge to a Navy construction project, illustrates the degree of judicial deference to the military when the issue of national security is raised in a NEPA case. In Catholic Action, the Navy built 48 earth-covered magazines on Hawaii that had capabilities for storing nuclear weapons. 112 Actual nuclear storage at the site could not be confirmed due to classification for national security reasons. 113 No EIS was prepared. 114 The plaintiff sought an EIS that would analyze: "(1) the risk and consequences of a nuclear accident, (2) the effect of a plane from nearby Honolulu International Airport crashing into one of the magazines, and (3) the hazard to local residents from low-level radiation." 115 The Ninth Circuit ordered that the Navy prepare a hypothetical EIS for a facility capable of storing nuclear weapons.
116
The Supreme Court held that an EIS was not required because the Navy was only contemplating storing nuclear weapons at the site; nuclear storage was not actually proposed. 117 The Court also stated that "ultimately, whether or not the Navy has complied with NEPA 'to the fullest extent possible' is beyond judicial scrutiny" because the trial would ultimately lead to the disclosure of confidential information.
118 Given this level of judicial deference to military secrecy, the military's assertion of a national security justification would almost always eliminate NEPA's effectiveness as a check on the military's decision-making process, even when the proposals and decisions may involve 109 
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ABATE major risks to the community and the environment where the proposed action is to occur.
Despite the Supreme Court's proclivity, as evidenced in Catholic Action, for deference to the military's national security objectives, NEPA's emergency exception is a mechanism for courts to properly balance the national security and environmental protection concerns at issue in Navy sonar cases under NEPA.
119 Pursuant to Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations, federal agencies may be allowed to take different steps to comply with their NEPA obligations in the case of emergencies, provided that certain conditions are met. 120 The applicable language of the CEQ regulations provides:
Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action with significant environmental impact without observing the provisions of these regulations, the Federal agency taking the action should consult with the Council about alternative arrangements. Agencies and the Council will limit such arrangements to actions necessary to control the immediate impacts of the emergency. Other actions remain subject to NEPA review.
121
Only four cases involving challenged to CEQ's granting of alternative arrangements under the emergency exception have led to published decisions.
122
Courts have upheld the CEQ's determination in all of these cases. 123 The three cases before Winter v. NRDC that challenged CEQ's grant of alternative arrangements differed from Winter because the cases dealt with emergency exceptions backed by a satisfactory NEPA document, either before or after the action. 124 However, in Winter v. NRDC, the EA-FONSI was found to be insufficient, and therefore there was no proper NEPA document.
125
The first case to challenge the CEQ's grant of an alternative arrangement under the emergency exception was Crosby v. Young. 126 In Crosby, the Department of Housing and Urban Development was allowed to release funding prior to Detroit City Council's completion of an EIS. 127 were delayed, the project would risk cancellation, which would be detrimental to the city and its citizens. 128 The EIS was completed at a later date.
129
National Audubon Society v. Hester 130 involved a challenge to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS's) decision to take the last wild condors into captivity in an effort to save the species. 131 In the agency's EA-FONSI, the preferred alternative had been to leave some condors in the wild and capture others. 132 The district court held that there was no emergency because FWS had reviewed the situation just months earlier in an EA 133 ; however, the D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in substituting its judgment for the CEQ. 134 The D.C. Circuit concluded that FWS had a rational basis for changing its policy, especially given the lead poisoning death of a condor. 135 The court reasoned that once it had determined that the underlying agency decision "reflects sufficient attention to environmental concerns and is adequately reasoned and explained," its review was complete.
136
The last case to challenge CEQ's grant of the alternative arrangement under the emergency exception before Winter is important because the U.S. Air Force sought the emergency exception. 137 Unlike the two previous cases, Valley Citizens for a Safe Environment v. Vest laid the groundwork for the military to request alternative arrangements to NEPA requirements under the emergency exception to ensure military readiness. 138 In Valley Citizens for a Safe Environment v. Vest, 139 a previously prepared EIS supported the decision that flights would not occur from the base between the hours of 10 p.m. and 7 a.m."
140 With the U.S. commitment of forces to Operation Desert Storm, however, the Air Force began 24-hour operations from the base. 141 The plaintiffs requested that the Air Force prepare a supplemental EIS prior to the flights, but the Air Force sought alternative arrangements from the CEQ.
142
CEQ allowed the flights to continue and allowed the Air Force to prepare an EA within the year. 143 In evaluating whether the Air Force or CEQ had been 128 In NRDC v. Winter, 145 the CEQ approved alternative arrangements for the Navy to comply with NEPA because it had determined that emergency circumstances prevented normal compliance. 146 The CEQ had concluded that the district court's injunction imposed training restrictions on the Navy that caused a "significant and unreasonable risk that Strike Groups will not be able to train and be certified as fully mission capable."
147 Accordingly, the CEQ allowed the Navy to continue its exercises pending completion of the EIS.
148
Upon adopting the alternative arrangements and determining that it would comply with them, 149 the Navy sought to vacate the district court's preliminary injunction in light of the CEQ's actions. 150 The district court denied the Navy's motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 151 The Ninth Circuit held that there was a serious question whether the CEQ's interpretation of the emergency circumstances regulation was lawful."
152
The Supreme Court in Winter v. NRDC did not address the issue of CEQ's authority to issue an alternative arrangement under these circumstances. However, in her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg wrote that CEQ lacked the authority to absolve an agency of its statutory duty to prepare an EIS. Notably, Justice Ginsburg reasoned in this regard that "if the Navy sought to avoid its NEPA obligations, its remedy lay in the Legislative Branch. The Navy's alternative course-rapid, self-serving resort to an office in the White House-is surely not what Congress had in mind when it instructed agencies to comply with NEPA "to the fullest extent possible."
153 Therefore, in Winter v. NRDC, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to interpret NEPA's emergency exception in a manner that would promote equitable balancing between national security concerns and marine mammal impacts from Navy sonar. Unfortunately, the Court's decision fell far short of fulfilling that expectation.
WINTER v. NRDC: SALT IN THE WOUNDS
The Supreme Court's decision in Winter v. NRDC made a bad situation worse for environmental groups seeking to use NEPA as a weapon to protect marine mammals from Navy sonar impacts. The Court's decision, with its emphasis 144 Id. at * 5. 145 on the irreparable harm standard for preliminary injunctions, empowers the courts, rather than Congress and the agencies, to determine the degree of protection for marine mammals. This interpretation weakened the effect of NEPA litigation for Navy sonar impacts. To the extent that NEPA litigation remains a potentially viable avenue in this context, the Court also failed to address the scope of the emergency circumstances exception under NEPA as it relates to national security justifications for Navy sonar.
Lower Court Decisions
In NRDC v. Winter, NRDC sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Navy for its planned use of mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar in training exercises. 154 The Navy was conducting MFA sonar training exercises off the coast of Southern California, home to 37 species of marine mammals potentially imperiled by this practice.
155 NRDC filed the action alleging that the Navy violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS.
156
The United States District Court for the Central District of California issued the injunction on the grounds that (1) the Navy failed to prepare an EIS as required by NEPA, and (2) the Navy failed to take into account its use of MFA when it submitted its consistency determination to the California Coastal Commission as required by the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).
157
The district court concluded that the plaintiffs would more than likely succeed on the merits of the case because irreparable harm would result if the injunction were not granted.
158
The Navy appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which remanded the decision to the district court to impose injunctive measures that would allow the Navy to continue using MFA sonar while mitigating the sonar's effects on marine mammals. 159 On remand, the district court imposed six injunctive measures 160 on the Navy's use of MFA sonar. 161 The Navy 160 Six injunctive measures were imposed on the Navy's MFA sonar: 1. Imposing an exclusionary zone, covering a distance from the coast to twelve miles, within which MFA sonar could not be used; 2. increasing the amount of monitoring for marine mammals, both during and prior to exercises; 3. requiring a ten minute monitoring period for helicopters before they deploy "dipping sonar," 4. restricting the use of MFA sonar in "geographic chokepoints"; 5. requiring the complete shutdown of MFA sonar when a marine mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of the ship in question; and, 6. requiring that MFA sonar be powered down by six decibels (dB) when a condition called surface ducting, during which sound waves travel much farther in water, is occurring. Id. 161 Id. at 433. 344 ABATE appealed two of those injunctive measures: the requirement to shut down the sonar when a marine mammal is spotted nearby and the requirement to power down while surface ducting 162 where sound waves are able to travel much farther through water. 163 The Navy simultaneously sought relief from the CEQ, claiming that the injunctions created an emergency exception, and the CEQ granted the Navy's application for relief. 164 The CEQ waived Navy compliance with NEPA by approving alternate guidelines for sonar use along the California coast. 165 In early 2008, President Bush signed an Executive Order exempting the Navy from sonar requirements for California contained in the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). 166 The Executive Order also exempted the Navy from having to complete an EIS under "emergency circumstances." 167 In light of these new developments, the Navy filed an emergency appeal, and the Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal. 168 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision that preliminary injunctive relief was appropriate, but concluded that a blanket injunction prohibiting the Navy from using MFA sonar was overbroad, and remanded the case to the district court "to narrow its injunction so as to provide mitigation conditions under which the Navy may conduct its training exercises." 169 On remand, the district court issued a new preliminary injunction allowing the Navy to use MFA sonar on the condition that it implemented mitigation measures.
170
On February 4, 2008, the district court invalidated CEQ's approval of "alternative arrangements" finding that the Navy was not exempt from NEPA's requirements, and denied the Navy's application to vacate the preliminary injunction. 171 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the CEQ's alternative arrangements exceeded the scope of the NEPA's emergency exemption and thus were invalid. 172 162 The Supreme Court in Winter held that the district court abused its discretion in requiring the Navy to power down MFA sonar by six decibels when significant "surface ducting" conditions occur. During surface ducting conditions, active sonar becomes more useful near the surface and less effective at greater depths. The Court concluded that because surface ducting is rare and unpredictable, it is especially important for the Navy to train under these conditions when they occur. See Winter v. NRDC, slip op. at 20-21. 163 Id. 164 Krueger, supra note 159 at 434. 165 
The Supreme Court Decision
In a much-anticipated opinion, Justice Roberts writing for the Court vacated the lower court's injunction, emphasizing the importance of balancing equities and public interest. 173 The Court reasoned that the Navy's need to conduct training to respond to national security threats posed by enemy submarines outweighed the possibility of harm to marine mammals. 174 Quoting from George Washington's Annual Address to Congress, Chief Justice Roberts stated, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." 175 The beginning of Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion set the tone for the Court's weighing of interests in Winter and illuminates the main reasoning behind the Court's decision to vacate the preliminary injunction on the Navy's use of sonar in the case.
The Court articulated three main reasons to support its conclusion. First, the Court ruled that the lower courts' standard allowing issuance of a preliminary injunction based only on a "possibility" of irreparable harm is too lenient.
176 Instead, the Court required the use of a precedential standard that requires demonstration of "irreparable injury likely to happen in absence of injunction." 177 In the alternative, the Court ruled that even if plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury, such injury is outweighed by the public interest and the Navy's interest in training its sailors. 178 Second, the Court concluded that the balance of equities and consideration of the overall public interest "tip strongly in favor of the Navy."
179
A court is not obligated to grant an injunction as it is a discretionary remedy never awarded as of right. 180 Military interests do not always trump other considerations in this balancing process, but courts must give deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the importance of military interest. 181 In this case, the Court noted that the record "underscored the threat posed by enemy submarines and the need for extensive sonar training to counter this threat."
182 It emphasized that the training could not be accomplished under the challenged mitigation restrictions. 183 Third, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts' justifications for entering the preliminary injunction were not persuasive. 184 185 The lower courts failed to defer to senior Navy officers' predictive judgments about how the preliminary injunction would reduce the effectiveness of the training exercises. 186 In addition, the lower courts abused their discretion by requiring the Navy to shut down MFA sonar when a marine mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of a sonar-emitting vessel. 187 The lower courts held that this zone would not be overly burdensome because marine mammal sightings during training exercises are relatively rare. 188 However, because training scenarios can take several days to develop, each shutdown can result in the loss of several days' worth of training. 189 The Court determined that the district court also abused its discretion by requiring the Navy to power down MFA sonar during significant surface ducting conditions. 190 Given that surface ducting is both rare and unpredictable, the Navy must be able to train under these conditions when they occur.
191
The majority decision contains both procedural and substantive flaws. Procedurally, the Supreme Court inappropriately reversed the case based on the mere disagreement with the lower courts' decision. The majority clearly disagreed with the district court's conclusions, but under well-established precedent mere disagreement is not a sufficient basis for reversal. "The clearly erroneous standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently."
192
The majority also failed to apply traditional appellate review standards, and rejected the district court's finding of irreparable harm while endorsing the Navy's declarations regarding threat to national security. 193 The majority recognized that the case involved "complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force." focused not on the merits of the environmental review but on whether the preliminary injunction that the district court issued was too broad. In this regard, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court's injunction was too broad, holding that the injunction improperly prevented the government from approving partial deregulation without first complying with full environmental impact review. 193 Id. 194 Id.
Yet, the majority failed to recognize-and in so doing ignored Supreme Court precedent-that district courts are uniquely situated to analyze evidence and make determinations of fact even as to such complex issues. Nonetheless, the majority substituted its own judgment without identifying any clear error in the lower court's fact finding.
195
The Winter decision is also flawed substantively based on the majority's "unquestioned deference to an invocation of military necessity at the expense of the environment."
196 First, the majority's definition of cognizable harm made it inevitable that "military interests would prevail in the balance of conflicting harms and public interests." 197 Further, in "balancing the public's interest in national security against its environmental interests," the Court rejected the reasoning of the lower courts without laying out a framework for future decisions.
198 Finally, the majority gave "broad deference to Executive determinations of military necessity, leaving open the possibility that the Executive will stretch the definition of "emergencies" that trigger a NEPA exception."
199 As a result, the decision leaves the status of injunctions for procedural violations of environmental laws by the military in a state of flux.
200
This decision left unanswered the question of whether a court reviewing an environmental claim can disagree with the military's assessment of danger to national security. 201 The majority relied on mere assertions that the use of MFA sonar during training exercises is of the utmost importance to the Navy and the nation without requiring specific documentation or quantification of the threat. 202 Not only did the Supreme Court disagree with the lower court's logic, overturning the holding that infrequency of occurrence made the training conditions dispensable, but the majority seemed to take issue with the fact that the lower courts questioned the military's statements at all. 203 Although courts rarely second-guess military conclusions, they police the outer limits of claims of military necessity. 204 Courts have consistently held that NEPA does not include a military exception. However, in allowing the CEQ to define "emergency" exceptions broadly, the Court may have created a de facto national security exception to 348 ABATE NEPA. 205 Regardless of how the Supreme Court rules on Executive meddling in the future, the Winter decision only increases incentives for the military not to comply with NEPA.
206
While the majority avoided discussing the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent joined by Justice Souter, addressed these issues directly. 207 First, "if the Navy had completed the required EIS before taking action," the parties and the public could have benefited from the environmental analysis-and the Navy's training could have continued.
208 Instead, the Navy acted first, and thus thwarted the purpose an EIS is intended to serve.
209
The dissent then addressed one of the fundamental errors in the majority's holding: the military could conceivably avoid complying with NEPA at all times, if it alleged that compliance will threaten national security.
210
Congress has never written a military exemption in NEPA, despite providing similar exemptions in other environmental statutes.
211 While the Navy's training exercises are critical, they "do not authorize the Navy to violate a statutory command, especially when recourse to the Legislature remains open." 
RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS
The disappointing outcome in Winter v. NRDC is merely one symptom of a larger disease; namely, the Navy's ability to dodge environmental law mandates in the marine context. A long line of NEPA challenges to Navy sonar has yielded very limited substantive protections for marine mammals. 213 Consequently, the Navy's use of sonar has proceeded essentially unimpeded for the past two decades, protected by broad military exemptions from environmental laws that are supposed to protect vulnerable marine species.
In the wake of Winter v. NRDC, unanswered questions remain that require solutions at two levels. First, adjustments need to be made to enhance marine mammal protection within the NEPA framework. Second, outside the NEPA context, new substantive mandates are necessary to enhance protection of marine mammals from sonar's harmful impacts. Adjustments within the NEPA context will be easier to achieve if proposed substantive protections can be enacted. In addressing these new substantive protections, national security 205 Id. 206 interests and their relationship to environmental protection need to be revisited as a general matter and, in particular, in the context of Navy sonar's impacts on marine mammals. Congress and the federal agencies, not the courts, should direct the way forward in this re-evaluation of the clash between national security objectives and the sanctity of the marine environment.
NEPA's Applicability to the Marine Context Needs to Be Adjusted
Although NEPA litigation has achieved some success in compelling the Navy to delay or adjust its use of sonar, NEPA will never be a sufficiently viable tool for marine mammal protection. This reality cannot be overcome even with the help of valiant efforts from NRDC and other environmental organizations in seeking to use NEPA to it fullest potential to combat the Navy's use of sonar.
The reason for NEPA's shortcoming in this context is simple: NEPA is not a marine resource protection statute, and it is ill-suited to be so used. NEPA has been a weapon of choice in the Navy sonar context largely because the military has so deftly avoided weak substantive mandates in federal environmental laws relating to marine mammal protection that NEPA is the only statute available to afford any form of relief, albeit incomplete, to environmental plaintiffs. Neither the Navy's nor the environmental plaintiffs' ultimate objectives are served by protracted and costly NEPA litigation, especially given the "harder questions" associated with balancing national security and environmental protection objectives that remain unresolved in the wake of NRDC v. Winter. Therefore, to the extent that NEPA remains one of the more viable options for protection of marine mammals, a system to reconcile the Navy's assertion of national security objectives with protection of marine mammals needs to be established.
Two options have recently been proposed to reconcile these competing interests under NEPA. One proposal recommends that a national security exemption be adopted under NEPA to provide guidance for when certain national security objectives should not have to comply with NEPA's mandate. NEPA lacks a national security or national defense exception. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) 214 is the only major substantive environmental statute with a national security exemption, which was added to the statute in 1978. 215 The exemption requires the Endangered Species Committee to relieve an agency from ESA requirements when the Secretary of Defense requests such relief for national security reasons. 216 This proposal suggests that a national security exemption under NEPA is necessary because the extensive and time-consuming EIS process can impair NEPA, NATIONAL SECURITY, OCEAN NOISE 351 this regard: environmental concerns need to be built into to how the Navy conducts its sonar training exercises, unless the nation is involved in active military engagement with enemy forces.
New and Existing Laws Need to Provide Substantive Protections to Avoid or Diminish the Impacts of Navy Sonar on Marine Mammals
NEPA has been the weapon of choice by default in many Navy sonar cases. The reason for this unfortunate reality is that the Navy has been able to bypass the mandates of federal environmental laws in the name of national security objectives. 224 For example, in the Winter v. NRDC context, the Navy successfully dodged compliance with three substantive environmental statutes-the ESA, MMPA, and CZMA-as well as seeking to avoid the procedural mandates of NEPA.
In Winter, the SOCAL area where the sonar tests were being conducted was home to nine species listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA. The NMFS issued a Biological Opinion under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, 225 which concluded that while the SOCAL exercises might "adversely affect" certain threatened and endangered species, the exercises were not "likely to jeopardize the [species'] continued existence." 226 The NMFS also issued an Incidental Take Statement under which harm to these threatened or endangered species would be excused under the ESA as "incidental." 227 In addition, in January 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a National Defense Exemption, which exempted from the requirements of the MMPA all of the Navy's military readiness activities employing MFA sonar for the duration of the SOCAL exercises. 228 The Deputy Secretary of Defense conditioned the exemption on the Navy adopting a number of mitigation measures, which already had been standard operating procedure in the Navy's anti-submarine warfare exercises since 2004.
On January 15, 2008, President Bush signed an executive order exempting the Navy's training exercises from compliance with the CZMA. 229 On the same day, CEQ purported to approve "alternative arrangements" for the Navy to continue its use of MFA sonar while complying with NEPA, reasoning that "emergency circumstances" prevented normal compliance.
ABATE
The Navy's evasion of federal environmental protection mandates at issue in the Winter context only tells part of the story. There is a long and unfortunate history of erosion of species protection under the MMPA and ESA Amendments. 231 However, proposed amendments to the MMPA as of this writing seek to change that balance.
232
The environmental protection measures of the MMPA weakened under the weight of military readiness objectives. 233 Under the 2003 Amendments to the MMPA, the two types of harassment were redefined for military readiness activities: "Level A harassment" means an act that injures or has the significant potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock; whereas "Level B harassment" refers to an act that disturbs or is likely to disturb a marine mammal or marine mammal stock by causing disruption of behavioral patterns, such as migration, breathing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering, to a point where such behavioral patterns are abandoned or significantly altered. These definitions are much narrower than the general definition of harassment (applicable to non-military actors), which is an act that (i) has the potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild; or (ii) has the potential to disturb a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild by causing disruption of behavioral patterns, including, but not limited to, migration, breathing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering.
234
In other words, more harm is required for military readiness activities before they rise to the statutory level of harassment. The military also benefits from a weaker definition of the "incidental take" requirement as applied to military readiness activities. 236 and the second in January 2007 for two years. 237 The Navy stated that the longer two-year exemption would allow it to continue critical training while preparing a comprehensive environmental compliance plan for its ranges and operating areas. 238 In response to these gaping holes in the substantive protections for marine mammals in key federal environmental statutes, two proposals may promote enhanced protection of marine mammals from the impacts of Navy sonar. First, the MMPA needs to be amended in two ways to add a citizen suit provision to enhance citizen enforcement under the Act and a narrowly tailored national security exemption like the provision in the ESA. Second, new substantive protections need to be enacted at the domestic and international levels to address marine mammal protection.
The MMPA is one of only a few major environmental statutes without a citizen suit provision. 239 The reasons for this omission are unclear but the effects of this omission are painfully evident. Since the 1970s, citizen suit provisions have been enormously valuable in promoting citizen enforcement of environmental laws, and they are more valuable than ever in the post-9/11 era. 240 Compared to suits filed under the Administrative Procedure Act, cases filed under citizen suit provisions are more likely to promote compliance with substantive mandates by having citizen-plaintiffs serve as private attorneys general under the Act. 241 Because of the congressional blessing that citizen suits represent for potential plaintiffs to be eligible to sue under these statutes, citizen suits are less likely to be dismissed on standing and other procedural ABATE grounds. 242 Moreover, the procedural injuries that plaintiffs typically allege in MMPA suits are more likely to prevail when brought under a citizen suit provision. Although far from a guarantee of success, the federal courts and the Supreme Court have recognized procedural injury as a viable form of injury under the citizen suit provisions of other environmental laws. 243 To enhance protection of marine mammals in the future, substantive protections are essential at the domestic and international levels. There are three principal ways in which this goal can be achieved: protect species, protect habitat, and promote regional and international cooperation on marine mammal conservation.
With regard to protecting species and promoting international cooperation, a bill to amend the Whale Conservation, Protection, and Study Act (WCPSA), 244 pending before the House of Representatives as of this writing, would offer valuable substantive protections for whales if enacted by promoting international whale conservation, protection, and research. Perhaps most significant for the purposes of this article's analysis, the bill calls for international cooperation to address the adverse effects of anthropogenic noise on whales and other marine life, recognizing the importance of military readiness activities which shall, so far as is reasonable and practicable, be conducted in a manner consistent with those efforts." 245 This language is a refreshing shift in priorities compared to the outcome in Winter because it reflects a presumption in favor of environmental protection goals and mandates that military readiness activities be conducted in a manner consistent with these goals. In addition, given the highly migratory nature of whales, promoting regional and international cooperation is essential for effective management. In this regard, the bill seeks to "conclude a whale protection Agreement with the Government of Canada aimed at coordinating and promoting conservation efforts for whales that migrate through waters of both countries. 246 To further promote regional and international cooperation, the bill also calls for international marine protected area networks, 247 which is a growing trend in other nations and regions of the world and is an indispensable regulatory tool for effective management of marine mammals. 248 Substantive protections are not limited to a focus on particular species, however. On January 19, 2010, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) released a proposed plan to reduce adverse effects on marine mammals resulting from the Navy's use of MFA in training exercises. 249 The plan calls for the Navy to limit its use of sonar in "hot spots" (important marine mammal habitat) along the Atlantic coast, in the Gulf of Mexico, and along the Southern California coast where the use of mid-frequency sonar endangers whales, porpoises, and dolphins. 250 Another habitat-oriented substantive protection provision in NOAA's proposed plan involves creating a "comprehensive sound budget" for the oceans to reduce human sources of ocean noise and address problem of cumulative impacts. 251 A Navy sonar case pending in the Southern District of Georgia as of this writing illustrates the critical need for these new and enhanced substantive protections for marine mammals. In January 2010, Defenders of Wildlife and several other environmental groups filed a lawsuit challenging the Navy's use of sonar at a proposed Undersea Warfare Training Center. 252 The lawsuit seeks to protect endangered right whales by compelling the Navy to comply with NEPA, ESA, and the APA before proceeding with plans for a training range. 253 The proposed training center would be located in "an area 500 nautical miles in size" southeast of the Georgia/Florida border. 254 However, the training center would be not-so-conveniently located adjacent to waters where right whales give birth to and nurse their calves each year from November to April. 255 This case differs from Winter in two important ways. First, there are other threats in this situation in addition to the impacts of sonar (i.e., right whales are especially vulnerable to ship strikes because of their size and slow movement). 256 Second, the North Atlantic right whale is listed as critically endangered under the ESA. 257 Even Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 356 ABATE majority in Winter, conceded that the Navy's national security interests would not necessarily trump environmental concerns in every case. Therefore, the Defenders of Wildlife case appears to be the right set of facts to weaken the applicability of the Winter outcome. Better still, it also serves to underscore the need to address these clashes between the Navy and marine mammal protections in a manner outside the NEPA context, and outside the courts entirely. Substantive protections of species and habitat through measures such as the proposed amendments to the WCPSA and NOAA's hot spots program offer a much better alternative to enhance protection of these vulnerable species rather than allowing NEPA litigation and the courts to determine their fate.
CONCLUSION
Joel Reynolds, a senior attorney with NRDC and a veteran of NEPA litigation challenging Navy sonar for the past two decades, offered these thoughtful observations about the past and future of balancing the needs of the Navy and marine mammals:
In each case . . . the district courts have affirmed the principle that, absent an explicit statutory exemption, those laws apply not just to the rest of us but also to the military services in their training for our national defense, even in this post 9/11 era. And as settlement agreements have been achieved in those cases-agreements that allow the Navy to continue to train but under terms requiring a higher level of environmental compliance-it has become increasingly difficult to dispute that a balance between military preparedness and environmental protection is achievable if only there is a will to achieve it.
258
Such a balance between national security and environmental protection is achievable, but not on an ad hoc basis in NEPA litigation. This article maintains that striking the proper balance between clashing goals in the marine context is best achieved through substantive protections for marine mammals. These protections should be established by Congress and relevant federal agencies, which is far preferable to another decade of procedural gymnastics under NEPA as interpreted by a Supreme Court that is more deferential than ever to military prerogatives. To the extent NEPA remains as one tool within a broader range of protections for marine mammals from the impacts of Navy sonar, NEPA's emergency exception should be the focus for evaluating national security objectives.
